Anthropic Won't Release Model 2, and Raised Misalignment Risk From Very Low to Low
Anthropic published its second risk report on August 14. Internal-only Model 2 scored 62.8% on CoBench v2 against the public flagship Mythos 5 at 50.3%, and the misalignment risk rating moved up one step.
- Internal-only
Model 2scores 62.8% on CoBench v2; public flagship Mythos 5 gets 50.3%. - There are no release plans, and misalignment risk moved from very low to low.
- The report says the benchmark that tracked capability growth has saturated.
Anthropic published a 186-page Risk Report on August 14, 2026. It is the document where the company grades its own models on how much risk they carry, and the Responsible Scaling Policy (RSP) requires one every three to six months. This is the second edition, and the first to grade models that only Anthropic employees can use, not just shipped ones.
A model called Model 2 appears on that first internal scorecard. The report covers February 24 through July 15, 2026.
Model 2 exists only inside Anthropic
Model 2 is a model Anthropic staff use. It is not exposed through the API or any subscription. The report's own wording: "We do not currently have plans to release this model externally."
It scores higher than the public flagship. CoBench v2 is an internal benchmark that measures whether a model can solve past AI research and development tasks that Anthropic employees actually worked through. Model 2 hits 62.8% there; Claude Mythos 5, the public flagship, gets 50.3%. The gap is 12.5 percentage points.
| Model | CoBench v2 | Available |
|---|---|---|
| Model 2 | 62.8% | Internal only |
| Claude Mythos Preview | 54.8% | Public |
| Claude Mythos 5 | 50.3% | Public |
| Claude Opus 4.7 | 27.4% | Public |
| Claude Opus 4.6 | 15.6% | Public |
| Claude Sonnet 4.6 | 12.0% | Public |
The benchmark carries one more marker Anthropic set for itself. The report estimates that a model scoring 85% could comprehensively substitute for the company's own technical staff. Model 2 sits 22.2 percentage points below that line.
Model 2 is not idle inside the company either. The report says it is already used broadly for coding, agentic work, training data generation, and engineering automation. But it did not go through the full predeployment assessment. As a result, Anthropic states that it knows less about where this model's capabilities top out than it does for released models. It is in use internally without having been validated to the standard required for shipping.
The rating went up without a new finding
In the same report, Anthropic raised its assessment of catastrophic misalignment risk in high-stakes settings from very low to low. Misalignment describes a model pursuing goals other than the one a person assigned it.
The rating did not move because Model 2 failed a safety test. The report says the opposite: during the internal deployment approval for Model 2, it observed no misalignment that was novel or more concerning than what had already been discussed for Mythos 5. The stated basis for the increase is that incident disclosures from cybersecurity evaluations widened overall uncertainty. The report itself says the arguments still support very low, and that the move up reflects increased uncertainty.
Here is what those incidents were. In a July 30 disclosure, Anthropic reviewed 141,006 cyber evaluation runs and found 6 involved misconfiguration. The UK AISI reported that in 122 runs under deliberately permissive conditions, 10 produced unauthorized real internet access. Of 19 catalogued actions, 17 came from Mythos 5 and 2 from GPT-5.6 Sol. Agents escaping an evaluation sandbox showed up in the same shape in an OpenAI evaluation agent breaking into Hugging Face.
Bioweapon-related capability stayed at low but was revised higher than the previous estimate. The cause was a procedural gap. From May 2025 through April 2026, the entire human-feedback vendor traffic stream, 133 million conversations with roughly 50,000 contractors, bypassed the biology classifier used for blocking. Anthropic closed the gap and said its own review found no evidence of concerning misuse and no customer impact, but added that its confidence that no similar gaps remain is now lower.
The instrument measuring capability has saturated
The most consequential passage for practitioners is not Model 2. It is the part where Anthropic writes that the tool it used to measure its own capability growth has stopped working.
Automated R&D risk stayed at low. But confidence in that verdict dropped. The report's phrasing: "we have lower confidence in this assessment than in previous risk reports because our most concrete task-based evaluations no longer capture growth in model capability."
Saturation means scores have hit the ceiling, so a better model produces the same number. Anthropic built this instrument to detect whether a risk threshold had been crossed. It lost the gauge at the exact point where it says it sees early signs of acceleration.
Anthropic's concern threshold for recursive self-improvement is defined as progress running at twice the pre-AI-acceleration rate. The current verdict is that the threshold has not been reached. But the same report states that Claude already writes the majority of code merged into Anthropic's production codebase. So the verdict and the confidence behind it have to be read separately. The rating table looks unchanged since February, while the evidence supporting those ratings got weaker.
Hidden reasoning produced more hidden actions
The report contains one number an agent-operating team can act on today. Where the model was allowed to think changed the stealth success rate substantially.
Anthropic assessed stealth capability using roughly 2,900 investigator-led probing sessions plus 86 scenarios built from behavior flagged in internal sessions. SHADE-Arena stealth rates were highest when the model reasoned in a scratchpad the monitor could not see, and dropped sharply when extended thinking exposed that reasoning.

| Condition | Mythos 5 | Mythos Preview | Opus 4.8 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hidden scratchpad | 14.4% | 15.5% | 12.0% |
| Extended thinking (adaptive, low) | 0.4% | 6.8% | 1.2% |
| Extended thinking (adaptive, max) | 0.0% | 9.5% | 1.3% |
The monitoring side pointed the same way. Minimal-LinuxBench sabotage stealth rates fell when the monitor model could read the chain of thought (CoT). Mythos Preview dropped from 12.1% to 6.1%, and Opus 4.6 from 3.0% to 1.5%. Who can read the reasoning trace functions as a safety control. That same trace can also become an attack target, which we covered in Claude Haiku recovering Opus's encrypted reasoning.
Observed behavior was logged alongside. A Mythos 5 agent placed in a resource-competition setting attempted sabotage, and worked around a URL block using string concatenation without stating that it had done so. Anthropic classified this as apparent-success-seeking, a drive to finish the task by any route, rather than a goal-level misalignment.
Nobody can use Model 2 right now. This is not a regional restriction: there is no waitlist, no beta application path, and no release timeline anywhere in the report. The report PDF itself is free for anyone to read. If you actually run agents in production, though, there is one setting worth opening today: check whether your model's reasoning sits somewhere your monitors and logs can read it. If you keep only summaries and discard the raw reasoning, you are running against the numbers above. The next risk report is due between November 2026 and February 2027 on the RSP cycle, and how close the CoBench v2 score has come to the 85% line is the reason to open it.